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Abstract. This paper deals with three basic issues in Islamic banking: 
First, how the profit sharing ratios in mudarabah contracts are in 
principle determined? Second, do the actual sharing ratios result in an 
equitable division of profit between the banks on the one hand and the 
depositors on the other? Finally, can the central bank use the profit 
sharing ratio along with the rate of interest for credit control so as to 
mitigate leverage lure in a dual banking system? 
The paper provides a brief explanation as an answer to the first 
question. The response to the second is negative but is positive to the 
third. It suggests a policy tool the central banks can possibly use to 
prevent the sort of credit turmoil as the world is facing today in 2008 
because of leverage lure. The tool may also help improve return to 
investors and thus establish some equity in the distribution of profits.  
Keywords: Islamic banking; Two-tier mudarabah; Profit sharing ratio; 
Division of profit; Leverage lure 
1. Introduction 
The determination of the ratios for sharing profit on investment between 
the firms and the Islamic banks operating in competition with their 
mainstream interest-based counterparts in a dual banking system as in 
Malaysia has been a familiar topic for discussion in the literature on 
Islamic banking including the contributions of the present author. The 
main determinants of profit sharing ratio (PSR) for banks were identified 
as (i) the expected rate of profit (r) on investment, (ii) the proportion (λ) 
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of bank money in total capital (K) firms employed in business, (iii) the 
market rate of interest (ri) and (iv) the risk value estimate (α). The issue 
was dealt with at macro and micro levels and it was shown that in 
principle the Islamic banking had superiority over interest bearing 
mainstream banks both in matters of returns and stability of the system 
(Hasan 1985 and 2002). Here we shall desist from going over the 
material and areas already covered in the earlier writings. 
However, some new developments in the area have prompted the 
current revisit to the area. Shamim Ahmad Siddiqui (2008) in his paper 
provides a critical appraisal of the theoretical models that incorporated 
the PSR issues in Islamic banking over the years. His survey especially 
highlights striking similarities the model of Anwar (1987) has with that 
of Sargent (1979) and notes that the former has merely replaced the rate 
of interest (r1) with a rate of profit (Ө) to make the latter look Islamic 
(PP: 250-251). Another paper that has received his attention is of Mohsin 
Khan and Abbas Mirakhor on the Islamic financial system (1989). Here, 
he provides clarifications to uphold some of the positions the authors 
have taken including the criticism of their equality of rates proposition in 
Hasan (1991)
(1)
.  
The present paper has three basic objectives: 
1. To have a look at the sharing ratio theory and the way that ratio is 
being currently used in Islamic banking  This we discussed in Sections 2 
and 3 that follow.   
2. To consider if the return banks provide on investment deposits are 
adequate. We shall investigate if the prevalent profit sharing ratios result 
in a fair distribution of profit between the bankers on the one hand and 
their clients on the other, and if not what can be done to remedy the 
situation. This is taken up in Section 4. 
3. To review whether the central bank could use the sharing of profit 
ratio, as is at times suggested, for controlling credit, assuming that 
                                                 
(1) We know what the banks receive from the firms is to be shared between them and their 
depositors, the bank would retain a part of receipts under the agreement. Thus, the depositors 
will not get the same rate of profit as the bank would get from the firms. Shamim Siddique is 
in error in defense of Abbas Mirakhor and Mohsin Khan on the point.   
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Islamic banks can and do create credit. Section 5 contains our 
observations on the point.    
4. Finally, Section 6 contains a few concluding remarks.  
The discussion that follows is cast in the framework of a mixed 
system of financing where Islamic banks operate in competition with 
conventional banks as in Malaysia. Since the banks in this country use 
the term mudarabah for the sort of financing this paper deals with, we 
shall use the same in the discussion that follows. Nevertheless, let us note 
some of the features of mode that make it different from musharakah. In 
mudarabah the profit sharing ration of the financier is necessarily smaller 
than his loss sharing ratio. The financier is an outsider and cannot in 
principle participate in the management of the firm. The money provided 
is for the agreed term only unless the contract is renewed. These features 
are absent in musharakah. Musharakah is like equity participation, the 
profit and loss sharing need not be different. The financier has a right to 
participate in the management of the firm. 
2. Profit Sharing Theory 
The initial theoretical models of interest-free banking were based on 
the view that ‘no risk, no gain’ was an exclusive principle in Islam for 
organizing banking operations.  The claim got inspiration presumably 
from the early days of Islam when mudarabah was the dominant mode 
for financing specific business projects or trading partnerships. That the 
claim was only partially true has already been demonstrated (Hasan 
2008). There can be areas such as leasing or mark-up pricing where gain 
can arise without virtually involving any risk in an Islamic contract. 
It may be mentioned that the notion of profit-sharing pervaded even 
conventional business organizations, let alone Islamic finance. For 
example, mainstream economics now sees profit in sharing profit with 
labor to the extent it helps maintain industrial peace. In partnership 
contracts also it allows profit sharing ratios for some of the participants 
to differ from their loss sharing ratios as in mudarabah
(2)
. The 
partnership contracts define profit sharing ratio as the one in which 
                                                 
(2) In fact, mudarabah was a pre-Islamic mode of profit-sharing finance that flourished as a dominant 
form of business organization around thirteenth century in the Muslim lands. 
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profits or losses of a business are shared as set out in the agreement. The 
ratios are usually expressed as a percentage of the total profit each 
partner will get. In some agreements there is a first charge on profits, the 
remainder is then distributed according to the profit sharing ratios the 
agreement contains. The profit sharing ratios are in general proportionate 
to capital contributions of the partners but that need not always be the 
case; the agreement may specify a different ratio for any of the partners. 
Thus, there are resemblances between mudarabah on the one hand and 
modern partnership contracts on the other. However, differences between 
them, especially because of the different treatment of the interest factor, 
are much more significant. For example, in conventional partnerships the 
profit and loss sharing ratios of partners are mostly the same as their 
capital contributions but in mudarabah the two are invariably different. 
Also, the non-intervention of the financier (bank) in the management of 
business is a mudarabah imperative
(3)
 but in conventional partnership no 
partner can automatically be excluded from participation in managing a 
firm’s business unless he agrees to be a sleeping partner. 
Mudarabah is a contract in which a financier, say a bank, provides 
funds to an entrepreneur (firm) for investing in a business venture to 
share profits in an agreed proportion, the loss falling on capital alone
(4)
. 
This view implies what we may call a pure mudarabah model where the 
financier is assumed to provide the entire capital to an empty handed 
entrepreneur; the model fits well even today to small partnership 
businesses to undertake specific projects
(5)
. But the modern economic 
scene is dominated by large corporations that have long eclipsed small 
proprietary businesses. Likewise, banks have almost completely replaced 
personal financing of the earlier era with institutional arrangements. 
What realistically fits in the present situations is the model of what we 
                                                 
(3) We restrict discussion here to mudarabah though musharakah is also a profit sharing 
arrangement. The reason is that the latter is akin to equity financing in modern corporations. 
(4) Paraphrasing Bank Negara Malaysia, mudarabah is an agreement made between a party who 
provides the capital and the other - an entrepreneur – who is thus enabled to carry out business 
projects on the basis of sharing profit in pre-agreed ratios. However, losses, if any, are borne 
solely by the provider of funds. Bank Negara Malaysia.  
      http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=174&pg=469&ac=383.       
(5) It is this classical puritan model of mudarabah that underlies the discussion in many writings 
on the subject including that of Shamim. 
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can term as mixed mudarabah, where the bank is an outside financier 
providing fund to running businesses on a profit sharing basis. 
Corporations operate mostly with their owner shareholders’ money 
supplemented by bank finance, if need be. Banks likewise finance many 
and varied sorts of businesses simultaneously. 
In a mixed mudarabah model - first mooted in Siddiqi (1978) - the 
bank provides λ fraction of total capital K invested in a business. Thus, 
borrowed amount of money L divided by K equals λ. λ operates both as 
the loss sharing ratio for the bank as also the leverage measure for a firm. 
It makes the business owners’ portion in capital equal to (1- λ) K. Of 
course, losses, if any, will be shared between the firm and the bank in the 
same ratios as are their capital contributions i.e. (1-λ) and λ respectively.  
Profit sharing applies to earnings that are allocable to the part of 
capital K a bank provides to the firm. Thus, if P were distributable 
profits, λP would be allocable to bank finance. A part (σ*) of λP is 
retained by the firm for entrepreneurial services rendered to make bank 
money earn a return.
 
Thus, what goes to the bank is smaller than λP. This 
makes the fraction (σ) of total profit P going to the bank smaller than 
both his loss sharing ratio λ and (r) the overall return on capital. Relating 
σ to overall profit (P) allows the treatment of the ratio issue at the macro 
level and helps construction of models to show that profit sharing ratio is 
a function of the variables identified earlier i.e. the expected rate of profit 
r on capital K, the proportion of borrowings λ in it, the market rate of 
interest ri and the risk premium α We have shown earlier that the sharing 
ratio for bank would be as under (Hasan 1985): 
i
σ (r )
r
λ
α= +  
Thus, in a competitive setting the sharing ratio σ at the macro level 
varies inversely with profit expectations r and directly with the remaining 
three determinants λ, ri and α. We shall use this result in the following 
Sections.  
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3. Profit Sharing in Practice 
Many banking companies, notably in Pakistan and now in 
Malaysia
(6)
, have been successful in mobilizing large amounts of money 
from the people in the form of deposits and publicize their profit sharing 
ratios as well. To illustrate, for the RHB-Islamic mudarabah is a term 
deposit “based on the concept of profit sharing. Under this concept, 
customers will provide the capital for the bank to invest for a fixed 
duration. The profit earned from the investment will be shared as 
dividend between the customers and the bank in the predetermined profit 
sharing ratios”. 
Investment accounts are classified as general or unrestricted where 
the bank is free to decide the use of funds; and special or restricted 
where the customer has specific avenues to choose from; other rules of 
the game remaining the same. The minimum initial deposit size for the 
General Investment Account is RM 5000 for one month or RM 2500 for 
two months; after which the deposit could be invested for specific tenure 
ranging from 1 to 60 months. For Special Investment Accounts the 
required minimum deposit amount is RM 100,000 for inflexible duration 
of 365 days. The profit sharing ratios are claimed to be the result of 
negotiations between the parties. This is not true. Banks invariably use 
standard form contracts; signing on blank spaces is neither expressive of 
free will nor of negotiation. 
Habib Bank of Pakistan announces each quarter two sets of profit 
sharing rates for the depositors: (i) declared for the preceding quarter and 
(ii) the probable ones for the next. It first apportions gross revenue into 
30% for the bank and 70% for the depositors. It may be presumed in the 
absence of required information that profit allocable for distribution is 
divided between various deposits categories on the basis of weight 
                                                 
(6) Shabnam Mokhtar informs us that in Malaysia the general investment account (GIA) is the 
largest type of deposit held by Islamic banks. It mobilizes about 33% of total deposits in the 
Malaysian Islamic banking sector. GIA has continuously outperformed other types of 
deposits, mobilizing about RM40 billion (US$11.43 billion) to RM60 billion (US$17.15 
billion) at the end of each month since January 2008. IFN, Vol. 5, Iss.10, Oct. 08 p. 16. 
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assigned to each. Profit rates are then calculated and declared for separate 
categories
(7)
. 
Table 1 provides the types of deposits, and the profit rates as well as 
the weighting system for the quarter ending June 30, 2008. A perusal of 
the data on the ratios obtained from the websites of four other Islamic 
banks including RHB, Standard Chartered Saadiq, Meezan and Dawood 
reveals the same pattern as Habib Bank shown in the Table. Some 
interesting common features - albeit varying in details - of banks’ sharing 
profits with their depositors are as under. 
Table 1. Habib Bank-Profit Distribution for the quarter ending June 30, 2008. 
Million Rupees Profit rates % Weights Assigned 
Less than  1 5.20 0.65 
1------------10 5.50 0.67 
10-----------50 5.75 0.70 
Savings 
More than  50 5.90 0.72 
       
Duration -- -- 
7 Days -- 0.72 
1 month 6.0 0.75 
3 months 7.5 0.80 
6 months 8.5 0.90 
1 Year 10.2 1.10 
3 Years 9.5 1.25 
5 Years -- 1.30 
Term 
Deposits 
Equity Fund -- 1.50 
Source: Constructed from the data reported at the website of the bank. 
1. Deposits are accepted in investment or saving accounts; the 
investment category is further divided into general and special.  
2. The profit sharing ratio varies from 30% to 40% for the bank; the 
other part is allocated to the depositors. Some banks apply the ratio in the 
first instance to gross revenue and then distribute profit among the 
depositors allocable to their share of gross revenue. 
3.  The distribution of profit among the depositors in the pool varies 
with category; savings receiving lower proportion than investments. 
                                                 
(7) The website does not provide explanation as to why PSR is applied to gross revenue in the 
first instance, how net profit going to depositors is calculated or what is the basis of assigning 
relative weights to different types of deposits. The remaining four banks have patterns closely 
similar to that of Habib Bank. Tables for them are not produced for that reason. 
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Within the category, rates of profit mostly move up with the amount and 
duration of deposits. We could not obtain information on how individual 
banks arrive at these rates. 
4. Banks included in the study all claim that the profit sharing ratio 
is the result of negotiations with the depositors. One is not sure if 
depositors, especially the smaller ones really have negotiating power and 
get opportunity to exercise it; or they simply sign on the dotted lines in 
the bank documents.  
5. The loss, if any, is borne by the depositors pro rata; the 
assumption being that banks have no moneys of their own to invest or 
keep it distinctly separate from that of the depositors in matters of 
investment. The pure mudarabah model is implied operating which is 
most unlikely in modern times. 
In any case, the question is from where the profit to be distributed 
among the depositors comes? Sufficient data is not available on the uses 
of funds side of Islamic banks. The information on the sharing of profit 
ratios between the banks and the firms they invest the money of their 
depositors is all the more scanty
(8)
. The paucity of data does not allow a 
fuller investigation into the appropriateness of profit distribution in 
Islamic banking. 
4. The Equity Question 
However, the question of fairness concerning the return the 
customers receive on their deposits in Islamic banking is of vital 
importance. For, fairness and justice is what Islam essentially stands for. 
Sharing of profit is mandatory in Islamic banking but of essence is what 
such sharing results in? In other words, what it gives to the depositors 
compared to the owners (shareholders) of the bank in the mixed 
mudarabah contracts. 
                                                 
(8) The Malaysian Economic Report 2008/2009 reveals two interesting features of Islamic 
Banking in the country. First, among the deposits the substantial (26%) and the highest 
growth (47.8) category of deposits over the two years is unspecified ‘others’. Second , bulk 
of the financing (60%) goes to the household sector signifying the dominance of fixed return 
murahabah in microfinancing and expanding credit card business; other sectors - agriculture 
manufacturing trade and insurance – put together receive the remaining 40% .(The New 
Straits Times Supplement 30 August 2008, P.7).    
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Let us preface the discussion on the point with an observation: 
history bears evidence that financing has ever been an instrument in the 
hands of the rich used against the poor for exploitation and oppression. In 
the past, the flow of funds in the form of loans was from the rich towards 
the poor; interest rates were kept high rather exorbitant even as most of 
borrowings were for consumption purposes. The poor suffered. Today, 
the flow of funds with banks operating as intermediaries is from the poor 
towards the rich as major part of national savings comes from the lower 
and middle income groups; it is pooled in provident and pension funds or 
insurance premiums. The funds so pooled go through the banks to the 
rich business tycoons of the community owning and controlling big 
businesses. The rates of interest are kept low; cheap money policy 
dominates modern economies. The multitude of depositors relatively 
poor from the lower rungs of society is cut off from high returns their 
savings help businesses earn by low interest rates they get. Inflation is the 
order of the day and reduces their real value further. Cheap money policy 
makes the rich available deposit funds just for a song to magnify their 
profits via leverage
(9)
. Thus, the free enterprise system was unjust and 
exploitative of the poor in the past; so it is today, thanks to the institution 
of interest. 
The return to depositors in Islamic banking has made the situation no 
better; rather it seems to worsen it further. The situation has to be blamed 
mainly on the use of standard form contracts. The rates of return 
depositors are normally getting are not much different from the 
corresponding interest rates {See Table 1} offered by the conventional 
banks on customer deposits
(10)
. “The Bank for International Settlement 
                                                 
(9) To illustrate, the bank in New Delhi where I maintain a NRE account offered me on October 
1, 2008 a long-term deposit plan for 10 years. Return of capital was guaranteed with the 
promise of a 10 – 12 percent annual return arising from a structured investment; the officer 
explained that the structure was composed of Government Securities, Infrastructure Lending 
and Equities; the annual yield being 30, 35, and 30 – 38 percent respectively. The return 
offered being around a third of what the bank would get on my money, looked unfair but I 
was told that it as a ‘take it or leave it affair’. The inflation running in double digits, it was 
otherwise also a losing game. I declined the offer and invested the money in real estate. 
(10) This author raised this point in a internal seminar INCEIF held on August 28, 2008 on 
Settlement of Islamic Finance and Banking Disputes: Issues and solutions where bankers 
and Shari’ah scholars were the panelists. The justification a banker who also presented an 
excellent paper to form the basis for discussion  provided was that Islamic banks, unlike 
their mainstream competitors, do not impose any penalties on depositors for premature 
withdrawals of their money. One is not sure how significant are such withdrawals. 
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reports that commercial banks earn anywhere from 11 to 31 percent per 
year as ROE going to their shareholders (the profit to bank owners after 
covering all costs). If there is true profit sharing in the promotion of 
profit-shared banking as is so earnestly being shoved into the Muslim 
conscience, is a rate of profit share that is equal to the conventional 
“interest rate” of roughly half the 11-31 percent going to the (bank) 
shareholders just? Common sense (leave alone the notion of justice as in 
Qur’an) would suggest that profit share is totally misunderstood in 
Islamic finance”
(11)
. There is no solace in win-win situation if some take 
away the lion’s share at the cost of the others. The concept of profit 
sharing loses meaning if it is divorced from the basic norms of justice 
and fair play Shar’ah insists on promoting. How can this be done is a 
complex question but the key presumably lies in central banks exercising 
some control over the profit sharing ratios. 
Classical jurists mostly conceived of mudarabah in its puritan form 
where the entrepreneur (mudarib) was empty handed all money for 
business coming from the financier (rabb al-mal). The pronouncements 
on the magnitude of profit sharing ratio for the financier were based on 
this view of mudarabah. Varying ratios were considered allowable by 
different schools and scholars, the Malikis allowing up to 50% for the 
financier (Hasan 1985). Such high sharing ratios could be considered just 
in that version of mudarabah and the tiny scale of business operations. In 
mixed mudarabah of today and large scales of operations the 30-40 range 
can be shown as exploitative of the depositors. 
Let us assume that in a project total bank finance is RM 10,000 (K). 
Of this the bank provides 4000 (KB) or 2/5 = λ of K and uses deposits 
worth RM 6000 (KD). The PSR, or σ
*
 for the bank, is 30% and the 
project ends with a profit P of RM 4000. Under mixed mudarabah rules 
40% of profit (λP) = RM 1600 accrues to the bank on KB and the 
remaining RM 2400 to the depositors. Now, of the latter amount 30% or 
RM 720 will be the profit share for the bank; the remaining RM 1680 
will be available for distribution among the depositors. Thus, the total 
profit going to the bank would equal 1600 + 720 = 2320 giving it a return 
on KB equal to 58%, while the depositors will get on (KD).just 28%. The 
                                                 
(11) I endorse this observation an unknown referees made in comments on the earlier draft of this 
paper.  
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gap between the two returns equals 30% even as the risk expose for both 
was the same. The reason is the high profit sharing ratio for the bank. 
What sharing ratio will keep the gap reasonable, say 10%? We explore 
below if a solution is available. 
( )
ϑ
σλ
+≤
=
+
r 
KλK
Pλ - 1   P
B
*
 
  toreduces  This  
λ- 1
λ
.
r
*
ϑ
=σ  
Presumably, one must target the leverage gain available to banks in 
providing finance as a control variable in view of t failures of giant 
financial institutions in the US during the current melt down. In 1989 the 
Japanese too were undone by the deception of rising leverage gains. Soon 
the lure became the demon of ‘de-leveraging’ starring them in the face: 
they had to pay the price 
Leverage must all the more be a matter for concern in Islamic 
finance as Islam, apart from placing emphasis on equitable distribution, 
does not encourage borrowing in principle: companies that have too 
much borrowing i.e. a debt ratio of more than 33% of their stock market 
value stand out of bonds. Such criterion means that Shari’ah-compliant 
investors are to steer clear of highly leveraged banks conventional or 
Islamic
(12)
. Indeed, it is time for the world as a whole to be wary of loans.   
Going back to our main argument, let us postulate that the central 
bank allows an Islamic bank the leverage gain not to exceed 10% 
additional to the rate of profit on total capital K (= KB + KD) it had 
invested in business. Beyond that all profit is to go back to the deposit 
holders. Now, in the above illustration, the return on capital employed is 
[(4000/10000)100] or 40%. So, the bank can have under the constraint a 
maximum of 40% + 10% = 50% return on its portion of capital (4000) 
i.e. it cannot have more than RM 2000 as profit. Of this 1600 has already 
accrued on its capital. So, it will have another RM 400 from the 
remaining profit to fill the allowable gap. This leaves RM 1600 for 
distribution among the depositors that would give them a return on KD of 
                                                 
(12) See ‘Faith-based finance’. The Economist (print edition) Sept. 4, 2008. 
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33.3 percent. The constraint would thus reduce the profit sharing ratio σ
*
 
for the bank from the original 30% to 16.67% in an ex post 
adjustment
(13)
. We may thus state that the Islamic banks are free to 
negotiate the PSR with the depositors subject to the provision that their 
leverage gain will not exceed by more than ϑ  percent over the rate on K. 
Let us fix the rule using the symbols in our illustration. 
The rate of profit on capital employed r = P/K and the maximum 
leverage gain allowed to the bank isϑ . The upper limit for return on KB 
= λK, therefore, is r +ϑ . The profit allocable to the bank is λP but it also 
gets σ
*
 fraction of profit allocable to deposits i.e. of (1 – λ) P. Thus, we 
may set up  
Notice that
λ- 1
λ
 is equal to KB / KD: an alternative expression for 
leverage.  
It is obvious that for any given values of r and λ the PSR would vary 
directly withϑ . Thus,ϑ  can be a policy variable that the central bank of 
a country can use for mandatory ex post adjustment of the PSR in Islamic 
finance to enforce fairness in the distribution of mudarabah profits. 
5. Profit Sharing Ratio and Credit Control 
We have argued elsewhere that in principle credit creation (and 
destruction) by banks is, within confines, an economic imperative for 
frictionless running and stability of an economy and in principle there 
presumably is no Shai’ah provision denying Islamic banks to participate 
in the process (Hasan 2008). Shamim in his paper (2008, Section 2.2; PP: 
237-238) provides for us a neat summary of the earlier literature on the 
point. He seems to go with the view that the absence of rate of interest 
from the scene in the Islamic system of finance does not reduce the tools 
of monetary policy because the profit sharing rates (ratios) can serve as a 
replacement.   
In contrast, we are of the view that profit sharing ratio is apparently 
not a price for credit like the rate of interest and cannot, therefore, take its 
place in the central banks’ arsenal of credit control. We shall now discuss 
                                                 
(13) The bank gets 1600 as profit accrual on its capital and the remaining 400 from 2400 allocable 
to depositors. Thus, σ = 400/2400 = 16.67%. 
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the implications if attempts were made to use the sharing ratio for the 
purpose. The exercise has significance because in most countries a dual 
monetary system with mainstream commercial banks operating along 
with Islamic banks is in operation but it is regulated by a unitary policy. 
The use of profit sharing ratio as a monetary policy tool raises some 
ticklish questions. For instance, which of the profit sharing ratios - σ or 
σ
*
 - is to be the target variable? Here, the choice is not difficult; monetary 
policy being a macro level matter σ. 
Palpability wins the day. Under mudarabah rules, σ is essentially a 
matter of negotiations between the parties which we know is not the case 
with the rate of interest. The size of σ could differ from customer to 
customer within a bank as also between the banks. More complex 
questions include if in a dual banking system both the bank rate and PSR 
manipulations will be needed for simultaneous use or in isolation of one 
another? If used together, could the two be moved in the same direction or 
will have identical impact? Figure (1) may help answer some such 
questions. It has two sections X and Z. In section X, we have shown the 
relationship of profit sharing ratio with expected profit rate, treating ß = λ 
(ri + α ) as a constant (Hasan 1985)
(14)
. Section Z relates to mainstream 
macroeconomic variables and their interrelationships; it is divided into 
four quadrants A, B, C and D. In A we show the usual inverse relationship 
between interest rate ri and growth in output via the IS curve. Quadrant B 
sees interest rate in a negative relationship with the expected rate of profit 
r. In C we show investment having positive correlation with profit 
expectations while D relates savings (= I) to growth. The solid line 
rectangle shows the various variables in a state of stable equilibrium that 
can be disturbed due to a change in any of them. If monetary policy uses 
(lowers) rate of interest to bring about the change (to cure recession) a 
whole process of adjustments is set in motion shown by the direction of 
arrows along the broken line path until a new equilibrium is established. 
The readjustment process is very complicated and immediate 
consequences of any change a monetary policy move may initiate are 
difficult to predict or control. Figure (1) provides a rather schematic 
demonstration. The corner points of each rectangle show that interest rates, 
profit expectations, savings = investment and growth in output can 
                                                 
(14) Refer to equation (1) above for ready reference. 
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      σ                               X 
                                                                  
                                          
                                                ß = λ ( ri + α)          Profit sharing ratio 
 
 
 
                                                                              σ
1 
                                                                              σ
2
     
Profit Rate (r)                                                        0                                        
simultaneously have values compatible with one another depicting a 
harmonious and stable state of macroeconomic equilibrium. However, it 
does not help specify and explain the sequence of events or pace of change 
as also the implications of happenings during transition from one state of 
equilibrium to another. However, the figure still provides some useful 
insights on the issue under discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1). Relationship between Profit (P) and Investment (I) via Interest Rate, i. 
Putting X and Z sections of the Figure together we can venture the 
opinion that the use of profit sharing ratio for credit control will not be 
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inconsistent with the positive correlation Thus, even if the central bank 
uses only the interest rate as a policy tool, the market is likely to readjust 
σ for new mudarabah contracts to match the altered rate of interest. In a 
dual financial system like the one operating in Malaysia, this result may 
be of value and significance; if interest rate applicable to mainstream 
banks were for instance raised to curb inflation, the profit sharing ratios 
will appropriately increase and the credit creation activities of Islamic 
banks, provided they indulge in it, will automatically be curbed. 
Even as the principle and relationships are clear enough, a central 
bank may face many cobwebs to clear as the questions like the ones we 
raised earlier will have to be answered to ensure the operational 
effectiveness of the instrument. For example, the constant β may change 
due to a change in ri, λ and α, individually or in combination and they 
may change in the same or opposite directions. It would be difficult to 
predict such changes or assess their impact. Thus, the overall impact of a 
change in σ may be quite hazardous to visualize. For its significance and 
complexities, this can be a worthwhile area for research in Islamic 
finance. Presumably, it would be easier and more effective to use ϑ  as 
explained above in place of σ as a policy variable. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has shown that the current use of mudarabah contracts in 
Islamic banking is beset with confusion and ambiguities. Even a cursory 
look at the prevalent profit sharing schemes, especially on how the ratios 
are settled and weights assigned to different categories of deposits with 
reference to amount and time period involved needs scrutiny and control. 
A Shari’ah issue involved in the matter seems to be this: if a one month 
deposit was not withdrawn after the expiry of its tenure but is renewed as 
investment - principal + profit earned - for another month, will such 
renewal not attract Islamic injunctions against interest? The bankers’ 
response to the query at the INCEIF organized seminar referred to earlier 
was that the reinvestment of principal plus profit is under a new contract 
and therefore the question is out of place. However, renewal under 
interest finance is under a de facto new contract too; renewal requires the 
consent of the depositor and the rate of interest may be varied.   
A study of profit rates the depositors are getting in Islamic banks 
gives the impression that, but for their commitment to faith; the believers 
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might choose conventional banks if risk factor was taken into 
consideration. The suggestion is to ensure fairness in the division of 
profit between the banks and the depositors that seems currently missing 
in the mixed mudarabah contracts
(15)
. This paper suggests for 
consideration a policy variable ϑ  the maximum enhancement over the 
rate of return (r) the banks get on total investment K. Moreover, Islamic 
banks and conventional banks involved in Islamic finance may be 
required to publish in their periodic financial statements profit rates the 
banks earn on their equity side by side the rates allowed on deposits to 
improve information and transparency. How free are the negotiations 
between banks and the depositors, especially the smaller ones, may also 
have to be looked into.  The use of standard contract forms that the 
depositors have no option but to sign on dotted lines is patently dubious. 
Table (1) above suggests that smaller size deposits are presumably 
attracting less attention of Islamic banks with reference to returns and 
facilities provided. Should they not differ in this matter from the 
mainstream banks? Is it possible to empower depositors by organizing 
them in some sort of councils for collective negotiations on PSRs? Such 
councils may be organized at the level of individual banks and have an 
apex body federating them. Possibly, legal basis for such organizational 
structures can be created and the central bank may play a role in the 
matter? 
In view of the current financial crisis - the worst capitalism has faced 
since 1930 - central banks must somehow put a tab on the lure for 
leverage gains to guard against similar turmoil in the future. Otherwise, 
the massive bailout exercise now underway in the US
(16)
 and elsewhere, 
even if successful, will certainly not be the last. This adds weight to our 
                                                 
(15) Some suggested in this context that banks may build return equalization reserves out of 
profits to smoothen rates differences over time. But what it has to do with the issue of 
equity. Narrowing differences does not improve the level of rates. Rather it raises the 
ticklish question of distributive justice between the present and the future generations of 
depositors. 
(16) The bailout equity purchase of giants in trouble like the AIG went up to 80%. At the 
European Financial Crisis Summit in Paris on October 4, 2008 called to seek a coordinated 
response to the deepening credit crunch, the Italian Prime Minister declared: “I want the 
message to go out from this meeting today: No sound and solvent bank should be allowed  
to fall because of a lack of liquidity” (TIO, P.22).  All this smacks of what we in India call a 
nationalization program. 
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suggestion of employing ϑ  as a constraint for manipulating σ in the case 
of Islamic banks along with the rate of interest for the mainstream 
institutions to control credit in a dual banking system as the one 
operating in Malaysia. However, it is a complicated matter involving 
many imponderables. Much research is needed before making a decision 
including the changes legal framework dealing with banking would 
require.   
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